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Abstract. One of the most important reasons that led Greece to the current macroeconomic 
instability is the high military spending during the last decades. Thus, it is necessary to 
examine the impact of military spending on economic growth for the case of Greece. 
Furthermore, it will be very useful to examine the arms race hypothesis between Greece 
and Turkey in order to identify if there is an interaction between these countries that leads 
to the high level of military spending. In this paper we empirically test the relationship 
between military spending and economic growth for Greece and Turkey during 1957-2013, 
and examine the validity of arms race hypothesis between the two countries. We deployed 
unit root tests, unit root tests with structural changes, cointegration techniques and finally 
Granger causality tests. Granger causality tests in the case of Greece and Turkey imply that 
the causality runs from military spending to economic growth, however we find that there 
is no evidence of causality between Greek and Turkish military spending, which mean that 
that these countries act independently. 
Keywords. National Government Expenditures, National Security and War, Arms race, 
Greece, Turkey,  Economic Growth,  ADF, VAR. 
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1. Introduction 
he majority of governments face contradictory demands to provide 
resources for a rapid increase of development and economic growth, 
expanded welfare services, better education, infrastructure, health system, 
living standards, and finally greater national security. Hence, the government 
authorities of these countries are required to bring together three goals; the national 
defence and security, the increase of the development and economic growth, and 
finally their political survival. Military spending is one of the most important topics 
in the government budgets allocation and is one of the major users of scarce 
resources. In some countries, such as Greece and Turkey, large amounts of the 
budget are still allocated for defence spending every year which implies the 
sacrifice of alternative civil spending, such as education and health spending. 
Another reason which reinforces the importance of this empirical paper is the 
inconsistency of previous literature findings. Various studies (Antonakis & 
Karavidas, 1990; Antonakis, 1997; Andreou, Parsopoulis & Vrahatis, 2002) have 
 
a† Harper Adams University, Land, Farm and Agribusiness Management Department, U.K. 
.                      . dpaparas@harper-adams.ac.uk 
b  German University in Cairo, Department of Management Technology,  New Cairo City, Egypt.  
.                      . Christian.richter@guc.edu.eg 
c Research student. 
T 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 3(1), D. Paparas et al., p.38-56. 
39 
found that military spending has a negative impact on economic growth in Greece. 
However, there are several studies, such as Chletsos & Kollias (1995), and 
Balfousias & Stavrinos (1996), which identified a positive impact. Finally, there is 
no common pattern in empirical studies (Majeski & Jones, 1981; Kollias, 1991; 
Kollias & Paleologou, 2002; Ocal, 2003; Ocal & Yildirim, 2009) which examined 
the arms race hypothesis between Greece and Turkey. 
The study of Benoit (1973) was the starting point for most research to 
investigate the relationship and the interaction between military spending and 
economic growth. Benoit found evidence of a positive relationship in LDCs (less 
developed countries). However, despite the large number of studies in this topic 
there is no universally accepted conclusion if defence spending leads to an increase 
or decline of economic growth. Chan (1985) implied that "the claims to generality 
based on the results of such a search tend to entail substantial costs in empirical 
sensitivity and specificity" (Chan, 1985, pp. 433). Neuman (1979) claimed that 
"despite the volume of writing on the subject, we still do not know whether there is 
a causal relationship between military expenditures and development, much less 
what this relationship is " (Neuman, 1979, pp. 478). 
During the last decades rapid changes occurred in economies, such as the 
transformation of financial systems, the need for greater national security, the 
massive increase in oil prices, the international debt crisis, major recessions of 
developed countries, and finally public policy problems in Europe and the US. 
Many economists (Deger, 1986; Deger & Sen 1983; Antonakis, 1997; Antonakis & 
Karavidas, 1990; Nikolaidou, 1999) and policymakers assumed that military 
spending reduces development and economic growth, however, this view is very 
simplistic. There is reasonable evidence that certain characteristics of military 
spending can be productive, while there is no obvious evidence that its reduction 
leads to an increase in economic growth, and also it cannot be generalized across 
different countries or group of countries. However, military spending through the 
provision of security leads to an environment with improved safety and 
productivity. 
The relationship between military spending and economic growth is very 
complex, because the relationship may not have unidirectional causality. Thus, any 
model attempting to test this relationship has to investigate any possible bi-
directional causality. The next figure (Figure 1) illustrates the complex structure of 
the relationship between these two variables. Some of the effects can be positive or 
negative, depending on the structural characteristics of the tested country. 
Perceived threats to national security may have an internal or external dimension, 
while both lead to higher military spending. Nowadays, the majority of studies 
examining the economic impact of military spending in individual countries have 
focused either on developed or developing countries. Only a few studies have 
examined the effect of military expenditure on economies that are at an 
intermediate level of development, like most of the European countries. 
Greece is a very interesting case in the European Union for examining the 
relationship between military spending and economic growth. Greece is a small, 
industrialised country, with many economic problems such as huge deficits, an 
exploding public debt and security concerns with Turkey, with the Former 
Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and finally with Albania. This is 
the reason why, even after the end of the Cold War, Greece continued to spend a 
significant share of GDP on defence. According to SIRPI, Greece was ranked fifth 
among the major recipients for convential weapons during the last 10 years (while 
Turkey was first, Spain 20
th
 and Portugal 23
th
). The troubled relationship between 
Greece and Turkey is not recent since both have had a history of invading each 
other. Greece has been a full member of the EU in 1981, while Turkey became a 
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candidate in 2005 and both have been allies of NATO since 1952. Despite their 
joint participation in these institutions, they continued to have antagonistic 
relations (Rumelili, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1. Security Development: the linkages 
 
The military spending in Greece and Turkey as a share of GDP, Table 1, in 
2000 is higher in comparison with the NATO counties and NATO European 
countries. Moreover, since 1990's, military spending still increases, whereas in 
other European and OECD countries it has fallen. This occurred due to the tense 
relations with Turkey and the need to defend a very long coastline while having 
borders with non-European countries. Hence, the military spending, in part, can 
explain the huge public sector of Greece. However, no attempt was made to 
analyse the efficiency of this large defence spending. 
 
Table1. Defence expenditure in Greece and NATO (as a share of GDP) 
 Greece Turkey NATO European NATO Total  
1990-94 3.6 3.7 2.6 3.5  
1995 3.2 3.9 2.3 3  
1996 3.2 4.1 2.2 2.8  
1997 3.2 4.1 2.2 2.7  
1998 3.1 3.2 2.1 2.6  
1999 3.1 3.98 2.1 2.6  
2000 3.3 3.74 2.1 2.5  
2009 3.1 3.2 2.1 2.4  
Source: Ministry of National Economy and Finance, Budget, SIRPI. 
 
2. Literature review 
In the political economy, national security is defined as a public good with high 
externalities. National security was totally financed by the government, while other 
public goods such as health and education have their private counterparts. 
However, during the last 2 decades there are several private military companies 
provides military services
1
. The authorities of some developing countries claimed 
that enlarged military spending leads to an increased security, however, this may 
not be always true. Deger & West (1987) stated that “ at least some LDCs , there 
may be some connection between ultra-sophistication of strategic plans, excess 
military spending leading to „overkill‟, and escalation of costs.” (Deger & West, 
1987, pp. 7). 
According to Smith (1980b) the impact of military spending on economic 
growth is negative in 14 OECD countries. However, he mentioned that this does 
 
1 Generally known as security contractors, private military contractors or private security contractors. 
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not necessarily apply in LDCs, because in these countries the spirit of militarism 
helps the government authorities to increase defence at the expense of the social 
wage. We can understand that the economic impacts of military spending are likely 
to be different in developed and in less developed countries.  
2.1. Previous theoretical studies 
Keynesian school 
Keynesians supported that the state is an institution which stands over classes 
and cares about the general interest of the society. Defence spending is a form of 
public expenditures that has a positive impact on aggregate demand. At the same 
time, employment and other economic variables also lead to an increase in 
economic growth. According to Dunne & Mohammed (1995), the Keynesian 
theoretical framework emphasizes the role of military spending which increases 
national income through the multiplier effect. This framework was developed by 
Smith (1980a) and provided the basis for most of the subsequent studies examined 
the economic impact of military expenditure. He claimed that this approach was 
more successful as a means of examining the economic effects of military spending 
in LDCs, rather than the neo-classical approach. 
Faini et al. (1984) claimed that the Keynesian model is the strongest argument 
advocating that increased defence spending has a positive impact on economic 
growth. They implied that in an economy with excess production capacity, the 
increased aggregate demand for any source, such as defence spending, will lead to 
an increase of the national output. Furthermore, there will be capacity utilization, 
possible profit rates, investment will increase in response to higher profits and the 
economy will follow a faster path in the long run. According to Dunne & Birdi 
(2002), the Keynesian models consider military spending simply as one component 
of aggregate national spending and, therefore, focus on the economy‟s demand.  
Antonakis & Karavidas (1990) estimated a single demand-side model for the 
period 1950-1985 so as to test the relationship between military spending and other 
aggregates of the Greek economy (private investment, government investment, 
health, social, educational services). They found that the relationship between 
growth and defence spending is negative and suggested that the opportunity cost
2
 
of defence constitutes a burden on the Greek economy. 
The Keynesian framework is frequently used in the literature in order to investigate 
the relationship between military spending and economic growth.  The model is: 
 
𝒀 = 𝑸 −𝑾 = 𝑪 + 𝑰 + 𝑫 + 𝑻                       (1) 
 
Where Y is the actual output, Q is the summary of demands for goods and 
services, W is the difference between actual and potential output (Q), C is the 
consumption expenditure, I is the investment expenditure, D is the defence 
spending and T is the trade balance. 
Another article which applied a demand side model was developed by Smith 
(1980a). He used data from 14 OECD countries for the period between 1954 and 
1973. He tested the crowding out effects between military spending and economic 
growth, and hypothesised that there is a trade-off between defence spending, 
economic growth and investment. There was empirical evidence that the 
coefficient of military spending was negative and implied that an increase of these 
expenditures leads to a decrease of investment. However, he mentioned that this 
 
2 Defence spending allocates scarce resources away from productive civilian investment and fails to 
create any additional savings; hence, we have a shortage of funds for public welfare projects, such 
as education and health. 
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does not necessarily apply in LDCs, because in these countries the spirit of 
militarism helps the government authorities to increase defence at the expense of 
the social wage. 
In accordance, Chletsos & Kollias (1995) used disaggregated military spending 
data in order to examine the economic effects for the period of 1974-90 in Greece 
and based their model on a typical Keynesian national income equation. They also 
found evidence that demand stimulation effects are due to wages and salaries paid 
to military and civilian personnel employed in the defence sector, rather than to 
indigenous production and maintenance of military hard ware. This is in 
accordance with a previous study made by Kollias (1994), who found that 
indigenous arms production in Greece had insignificant and very weak spin-off 
effects.  Furthermore, investment had a negative impact on public deficits, GDP 
and to total military spending, while it was positively related to a political dummy 
variable.  
The study of Kollias (1995) included a traditional Keynesian model for the 
period 1963-1990 in order to examine the Greek-Turkish conflict and military 
spending. He found that military spending has stimulative effects through 
aggregate demand. However, he could not draw safe conclusions about the 
relationship in Greece because in the same period investment and savings were 
found to be adversely affected by military spending. He suggested that an arms 
control agreement between the two countries, in order to achieve abalance of 
power at lower levels of military spending, couldreduce the costs of arming and the 
tension in the area.  
Finally, Kollias & Paleologou (2003) presented a demand function of military 
expenditure in Greece for the period 1960-1998. By using the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration approach, they found that external threats 
(Turkey) increased the defence spending. Furthermore, they provided evidence 
supporting that, even the domestic political changes that took place during the 
tested period, had a positive impact on defence spending. Finally, they implied that 
previous studies testing military expenditure demand functions for Greece 
concentrated on security and economic determinants, however, they ignored 
domestic political factors that could potentially have an impact on defence 
spending. 
Most of the previous studies that used this approach found evidence of a 
negative relationship between defence spending and economic growth. One of the 
most important limitations of this approach is that focuses only in the demand-side 
and ignores the consideration of suppy-side effects such as technology spin-offs 
and externalities. 
Neoclassical school 
The neoclassical theoretical framework considers defence spending as a pure 
public good provided by the state. In accordance to this framework, the state 
appears to maximise the national interest by evaluating the opportunity costs and 
security benefits of military expenditure. According to Smith (1989), this approach 
supports the view that military spending is based on the notion of a state, reflecting 
some form of social democratic consensus, and recognising the national interest. 
Military expenditure also seems to be vital in a dynamic context, which can 
provide shocks to the system. For instance, Hall (1988) used military spending as 
an exogenous instrument in order to examine the degree of monopoly in the U.S.A, 
while Barro (1990) implied that increase in defence spending has a significant real 
effect on output. The Neoclassical or supply-side model of defence spending and 
economic growth is based on the work of Feder (1983), Ram (1986) and Biswas & 
Ram (1986).  
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Feder (1983) introduced a model which included economic growth, investment, 
labour force growth, and export growth in order to investigate the relationship and 
the externalities between the export and the non-export sector in LDCs. Ram 
(1986) applied the same model and tested the relationship between the government 
sector and the non-government sector in 115 countries. Biswas & Ram (1986) used 
a Feder model (1983) to investigate the relationship between the military and non-
military sectors, and tested whether relative factor productivity differed 
significantly across these sectors. They did not find evidence of significant factor 
productivity in the tested LDCs and concluded that the military spending does not 
have any positive or negative impact on economic growth.  
In this theoretical framework, national output Y can be expressed as a function 
of labour, capital and technology which is usually proxied by defence spending. 
 
𝒀 = 𝒇 ( 𝑳,𝑪,𝑻)          (2) 
Where L stands for labour, C for capital and T for technology 
Similarly, Linden (1992) applied an augmented two-sector growth model and 
examined the impact of the military burden and government expenditure on the 
economic growth in Middle Eastern countries. His empirical results indicated that 
military spending has a negative impact on economic growth in the tested period of 
1974-85. On the other hand, the size of the government, oil prices and capital 
formation has positive impact on economic growth. He claimed that the difference 
in marginal productivity in different sectors is small and the positive externality 
effect of the government on private consumption is large. Finally, he concluded 
that country-specific factors had a minor effect on the empirical results. 
The majority of neoclassical models used in previous studies point out a 
positive relationship between defence spending and national output, through the 
positive effects of technological developments, which are generated in the military 
sector. Smith (1977) claimed that the neoclassical models have a very poor 
explanatory power because they do not deal with the complexity and uncertainty of 
international relations, and the conflicting interest of groups within the society. 
Finally, Dunne (1996) stated that "being ahistoric, for placing unrealistic 
requirements of computation and information on the `rational actors', for 
concentrating on the supply-side and for ignoring internal political and military 
factors" (Dunne, 1996, pp. 445). 
Mintz & Stevenson (1995) used time-series data for 103 countries in order to 
investigate the relationship between economic growth and military spending. They 
used a neoclassical model of the defence-growth trade-off that accounted for the 
externality effects of defence spending. They found evidence that non-military 
spending has a significant and positive effect on military spending while the impact 
from military spending is insignificant and, therefore, governments should not 
expand military spending for economic purposes.  
The study of Mancair (1995) used a supply model which contained the civilian, 
the non-military and the military public sector. They excluded the export sector 
because is unlikely to provide externalities to other sectors. They found evidence 
that the investment, defence spending and non-defence spending have a significant 
and positive impact on economic growth in the NATO allies. 
Finally, Antonakis (1997) made an attempt to investigate the relationship 
between military spending and economic growth in Greece for the period of 1960-
1990. He claimed that military spending may affect economic growth through the 
whole host of direct and indirect spinoffs, the reallocation of resources, and finally 
the creation of new sources. He used a simultaneous equation supply model 
comprising three equations; growth, savings and military burden. There was 
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evidence that the impact of military spending on economic growth is negative. 
Thus, he suggested that policy makers should leave military spending for security 
purposes only and reallocate government resources from the military sector toward 
civilian purposes. 
2.2. Previous empirical work 
Military spending and economic growth 
After 1970‟s, when Benoit found a positive cross-country relationship between 
military expenditures rate and economic growth rates in less developed countries 
(LDCs), a multiplicity of studies have been published on the impact of military 
spending on economic growth. Benoit (1978) made an attempt to explain the 
relationship between economic growth and defence spending on LDCs. One of his 
main findings, contrary to his expectations, was that countries with more military 
spending have the most rapid growth rate, while countries with the lowest military 
spending have the lowest growth rates. He stated that “It has been usually been 
supposed by economists that defence expenditures reduce the resources available 
for investment and so slow down growth. The evidence available for developed 
countries is at least not inconsistent with that view” (Benoit, 1978, pp. 271). 
Several studies (Deger & Smith, 1983; Deger, 1986; Faini, Annez & Taylor, 
1984; Lim, 1983) have pointed out empirical evidence of a negative relationship 
between military spending and economic growth. They focused on two kinds of 
trade-offs: the allocation effect (the guns and butter trade-off) and the growth effect 
(the guns vs. growth effect). The first strand of studies suggested that defence 
spending allocates scarce resources away from productive civilian investment and 
fails to create any additional savings; hence, we have a shortage of funds for public 
welfare projects, such as education and health. The second strand of studies 
implied that defence spending has a negative impact on investment which 
decreases economic growth. The study of Dunne et al. (2001) deployed a demand 
and supply model in order to investigate the relationship between military spending 
and economic growth over the period of 1960-1996. The estimations were derived 
from a Keynesian simultaneous equation model with a supply side, which allows 
for indirect effects. Their empirical results indicated that the major determinants of 
Greek military spending are not economic but strategic (threat of war with Turkey) 
and that the direct and indirect effects of this spending on economic growth are 
negative and harmful to the Greek economy. 
Another group of researchers such as Benoit (1978), Kaldor (1976), Kennedy 
(1983), Weede (1986), has indicated a positive relationship between military 
spending and economic growth. They suggested that military spending stimulates 
economic growth, directly and indirectly, by increasing the purchasing power, 
producing positive externalities, and finally enhancing aggregate demand. 
Moreover, military spending through the defence programs increases employment, 
education and technological training. Balfoussias & Stavrinos (1996) investigated 
the main interconnections of military expenditure with fiscal policy and 
macroeconomic performance in Greece by using a simultaneous equation model 
for the period of 1960-1992. Empirical results indicated that real military spending 
exerts a positive effect on real economic activity and unemployment. They also 
used a large-scale model and attempted to investigate the macroeconomic 
implications of alternative disarmament scenarios over the period of 1995-2000. 
They found that the reallocation of government resources from the military sector 
toward civilian use would result to a higher domestic output, greater employment 
level, and finally an improvement in balance of payments. Additionally, Sezgin 
(2001)  investigated the relationship between economic growth and military 
spending in Turkey for the period of 1956-1994. He applied a demand and supply 
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model using 2SLS and 3SLS simultaneous equation method. The empirical results 
indicated a positive impact of military spending on economic growth during the 
tested period; however, there is no impact of military spending on saving. He 
concluded that “determinants of Turkish defence expenditure are mainly its income 
level, the conflict with PKK and Greece‟s defence spending” (Sezgin, 2001, pp. 
84). 
Several studies did not find any empirical evidence of the relationship between 
economic growth and military spending (Biswas & Ram, 1986; Hill, 1978; Mintz 
& Stevenson, 1995). Mintz & Stevenson (1995) used time-series data for 103 
countries in order to investigate the relationship between economic growth and 
military spending. He used a model of the defence-growth trafe-off that is 
grounded in the neoclassic theory of growth which took into account the externality 
effects of defence spending. They concluded that non-military spending has a 
significant and positive effect on military spending, while the impact from military 
spending is insignificant. Therefore, governments should not expand military 
spending for economic purposes.  
Finally, he could not rule out the possibility that the defence spending has an 
indirect negative effect on economic growth and that this type of spending may 
disturb the economic growth in the long run through deficit, investment or export. 
Thus, in his second approach he focused on these indirect affects (see figure 2), the 
effects of defence spending on economic growth through investment or export. In 
this approach he re-tested the case of South Korea for the period of 1954-1995 
through a three equation model. His results showed that there is an indirect, 
delayed effect of defence spending on economic growth via investments and an 
indirect immediate impact through exports. Moreover, the impact of defence 
spending via investments may take some years to materialize and that reductions in 
military spending may encourage exports. According to the author, the reduction in 
defence spending may generate more capital sources, which help economic growth.  
 
 
Figure2. Indirect link between defence spending and economic growth. 
 
There are also several studies focused in single countries, and examined the 
impact of military spending on economic growth. Atesoglou (2002) made an 
attempt to examine the relationship between military spending and economic 
growth in the U.S.A. He used the Engle-Granger cointegration technique and found 
that there is evidence of a significant and quantitatively positive relationship 
between military spending and aggregate output. He implied that an increase or 
decrease of military spending will bring substantial changes in the long-run 
equilibrium path of the macro economy in the U.S.A. Correspondingly, Kollias et 
al. (2004) examined the effects of excessive military spending on fiscal policy in 
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Greece during the period of 1960-2000. They suggested that central government 
debt (external and internal) has been negatively influenced by increased military 
expenditure. However, they stated that in comparative terms, partisan effects on 
public debt appear to be more pronounced.  
Karagol & Palaz (2004) made an attempt to test the impact of defence 
expenditure on economic growth for the case of Turkey during 1955-2000. They 
deployed unit root, cointegration and Granger causality tests, and found that there 
is a long run relationship between the variables. Furthermore, the causality is 
running from defence expenditure to economic growth. Finally, they noted that the 
existence of causality in the defence expenditure output relationship may be due to 
resources being misallocated or wasted on defence expenditures. 
Additionally, several studies have focused on a group of countries, and focused 
mostly in EU and NATO countries. Gadea (2004) analysed the long-run demand 
for defence output through a homogeneous treatment of 15 NATO member 
countries between 1960 and 1999. They applied time series analysis techniques to 
test the interactions between either defence spending or defence burden and their 
main determinants, such as income, external threat and allied military spending. 
They noted that they “have tried to avoid ad hoc variables in order to obtain good 
individual fits, preferring instead to concentrate on a homogeneous treatment based 
on common variables that makes it possible to draw comparisons” (Gadea, Pardos 
& Pérez-Forniés, 2004, pp. 244). In accordance, Nikolaidou (2008) examined the 
demand for military expenditure in EU15 during the period of 1961-2005.  She 
applied a simple demand model and found that the results show clear differences in 
the determination of military spending in the long and the short-run. Military 
expenditure responds positively to changes of the output in both the short-run and 
long-run in almost all EU15 countries. As far as the crowding-out effect is 
concerned, there is evidence of verification both in the short- and in the long-run in 
Greece, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, while in Luxembourg only the long-run.  
According to Brito & Intriligator (1995) arms race is the competitive, resource 
constrained, dynamic process of interaction between two countries in the 
acquisition of arms. The arms race between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R. dominated 
the interest of politics during the last century. Some of the most important regional 
interactions nowadays are Greece and Turkey, Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan 
and finally South and North Korea. 
The first model that examined the arms race between two countries was the 
Richardson model (1960). He suggested three possible motives which lead a nation 
in peace to increase or decrease the military spending. He stated that: "First, there 
is the motive of revenge or hostility which is independent of existing armaments, 
and which tends to be enduring and constant. Second, there is the very strong 
motive of fear, which moves each group to increase its armaments because of the 
existence of those of the opposing group. Finally, there is always a tendency for 
each group to reduce its armaments in order to economise expenditure and effort" 
(Richardson 1960, pp. 13). 
A strand in the literature has examined the arms race between Greece and 
Turkey. However, there is no common pattern in empirical results of previous 
studies. Majeski & Jones (1981) applied the Richardson model for twelve pairs of 
countries which proposed as rivals in arm races. Their argument was that 
Richardson model of arm races is unjustifiably restrictive. In 7 cases they found 
that military spending of the two nations are independent, in 5 cases they found 
some form of independence. Finally, the dyad members, Arab-Israel, Greece-
Turkey and NATO-WTO show evidence of an interesting relationship, where each 
nation is responding to the actions of the opponent. 
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The study of Kollias (1991) included a multiple regression analysis in order to 
test if there is an arms race between Turkey and Greece. He hypothesized that 
when suitable variables are introduced, it is possible to capture the way that Greek 
military expenditure is influenced by the Turkish threat. He claimed that these 
variables have to allow for the strategic environment within which decisions are 
made by Greek military authorities. He found evidence that because of differences 
in size and quantitative of military disadvantage, Greece tries to offset this by 
gaining a qualitative advantage over Turkey.  Kollias & Paleologou (2002) 
examined if there is a Greek-Turkish arms race for the period of 1950-1999. They 
applied the causality methodology employed by Hendry & Ericsson (1982). Their 
empirical results support the view that there is an arms race between the two 
countries, since there is a bi-directional causality between military spending of 
these countries. However, they implied that military spending is a function of many 
determinants (economic constraints, alliance membership, external and internal 
concerns), which can have an impact on the level of military spending. 
Another attempt of examining the arms race between Greece and Turkey made 
by Ocal (2003), and used data for the period 1956-1994. He assumed that if there 
are two regimes that characterize the low and high growth of military spending 
periods, there is a possibility that military spending of one country have distinct 
impact on the military spending regimes in the rival. His empirical results indicate 
that Greece does not want to fall behind Turkey; however, he mentioned there are 
many factors affected these variables.  Finally, Ocal & Yildirim (2009) tested the 
long-run relationship between the military spending of Greece and Turkey by using 
linear cointegration techniques. They argued that if the adjustment towards long-
run equilibrium is asymmetric there should be applied nonlinear co-integration 
models. They included a threshold autoregressive (TAR) and momentum threshold 
autoregressive (M-TAR) models as substitute adjustment processes for the 
cointegration relationship. There was evidence that military spending in Turkey 
adjusted to discrepancies from the long-run equilibrium, while in the case of 
Greece did not. Furthermore, there was not any evidence of clear-cut bidirectional 
causality and implied that there is an arms race. They stated that the conflicting 
results of earlier literature probably occurred because some authors ignored the 
nonlinear specifications. 
 
3. Data  
The examination of the relationship between military spending and economic 
growth for Greece is particularly insightful, as it is a small economy, with many 
economic problems (huge deficits and public debt), and with many security 
concerns (especially with Turkey and Albania). Another interesting characteristic 
of the Greek case is the geographic situation of the country and the fact that it is the 
only EU country which does not have borders with another EU country. The Greek 
economy had increased economic growth especially since 1950s. The period 1950-
1970 was considered as a “Greek Economic Miracle” because the country faced an 
average annual rate of economic growth of 7%. However, by the end of 1960s the 
country faced many problems due to the international recession and the increased 
price of oil. Moreover, in 1974 the relationship with Turkey worsened and the 
government spending on defence increased, as a result of the Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus. 
It is important to mention the geopolitical and economic significance of the 
country since the birth of the nation attracted the interest of the Great Powers (the 
U.S.A., the U.K., France and Germany). Since 1829, Greece was dependent on 
international economic relationship (loans) with the Great Powers. Many 
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politicians and historians, in Greece and Turkey highlighted the significant impact 
of Great Powers in the tension between Greece and Turkey across time. Military 
spending in Greece as a share of GDP in 2000 was double in comparison to the 
NATO counties and more than twice the average of NATO European countries. 
The explanations for this difference are straightforward. Greece was not only a 
front-line NATO state during the Cold War, but also faced troubled relations with 
Turkey, which maintained high levels of defence spending after the Cold War 
ended.  
Our empirical analysis has been carried out using annual data for Greece for the 
period 1957-2010. We employ the following variables: LMIL (military spending as 
a share of GDP), LGDP (real GDP). The data that we use in our paper has been 
obtained from several issues of the National Accounts of Greece published by the 
National Statistical Service of Greece. For Turkey we used data for the same 
period, which was obtained from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI).  
As we noticed in the previous section, many authors found some empirical 
evidence for the arms race between Greece and Turkey. According to Brito & 
Intriligator (1995), the arms race is the competitive, resource constrained, dynamic 
process of interaction between two countries in their acquisition of arms. Kollias 
(1991) found evidence that Greece tries to offset this by gaining a qualitative 
advantage over Turkey, because of differences in size and the quantitative of 
military disadvantage. Ocal (2003) suggested that Greece does not want to fall 
behind Turkey; however, he mentioned there are many factors affecting these 
variables. Thus, it is crucial to investigate if the arms race hypothesis is valid for 
the case of Greece-Turkey. 
Figure 3 reports the military spending in these two countries as a share of GDP 
during 1957-2013. During the period 1957-1974 the Turkish military spending was 
higher than Greek. However, during the period of dictatorship in Greece (1967-
1974) there was an upward trend in Greek spending. The first break in our series is 
reported in 1975, one year after the Turkish evasion in Cyprus, a period of tension 
between the two countries. For the period 1980-1995 the Greek military spending 
overstepped the Turkish military spending. This period can be characterised as a 
period with increased public deficits and spending for Greece. Finally, during the 
last 15 years Turkey increased the government spending for military purposes and 
Greece tries to not fall behind. 
 
 
Figure 3. Military spending as a share of GDP in Greece and Turkey (1957-2013) 
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In this paper we investigate the relationship between military spending and 
economic growth in Greece and Turkey during the last 6 decades and examine the 
validity of arms race hypothesis between these 2 countries. Firstly, we use unit root 
tests to test for stationarity. Secondly, we apply the cointegration techniques Engle 
& Granger (1987) and Johansen (1990) to see if there is a long run relationship 
between military spending and economic growth. Finally, we deploy the Granger 
causality test to examine the direction of the causality.  
4.1. Unit root tests 
The first step in our analysis is to verify the order of integration of the variables 
since the causality tests are valid if the variables have the same order of integration. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (1979) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are applied 
in order to determine the order of integration of the tested variables.  The tested 
series are: LMil (military spending as a share of GDP), LGDP (real GDP), in 
Greece and Turkey for the period of 1957-2013.  
Table 2 presents the results of ADF and PP unit root and stationarity test 
conducted on the logged values of the tested series. These results indicate that all 
the series are found to have a unit root and are non–stationary at the 5% level. The 
unit root test for the first difference of the series in both unit root tests shows 
evidence of stationarity and the rejection of the hypothesis for the existence of a 
unit root in all the tested series. Thus, is considered that according the ADF and PP 
with intercept, or with intercept and trend all the series are integrated of first order 
(I (1)). 
 
Table 2. Unit root tests for Greece and Turkey, 1957-2013 
Greece 1957-2013, Intercept 
Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test (ADF) 
Variables t(ADF) P-Value  Variables t(ADF) P-Value  Critical value (5%) 
Lmil(0**) -0.95 0.76  ΔLMil(1) -5.49* 0.0000  -2.91 
LGDP(1) -1.50 0.52  ΔLGDP(0) -4.70* 0.0003  -2.91 
Greece 1957-2013, Intercept and Trend 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) 
Variables t(ADF) P-Value  Variables t(ADF) P-Value  Critical value (5%) 
Lmil(0) -2.35 0.39  ΔLMil(0) -5.48* 0.0002  -3.5 
LGDP(0) 1.35 0.99  ΔLGDP(0) -4.99* 0.0008  -3.5 
Turkey 1957-2013, Intercept 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) 
Variables t(ADF) P-Value  Variables t(ADF) P-Value  Critical value (5%) 
Lmil(0) -0.87 0.78  ΔLMil(0) -6.65* 0.000  -2.91 
LGDP(0) -0.84 0.79  ΔLGDP(0) -7.61* 0.000  -2.91 
Turkey 1957-2013, Intercept and Trend 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) 
Variables t(ADF) P-Value  Variables t(ADF) P-Value  Critical value (5%) 
Lmil(0) -2.65 0.26  ΔLMil(0) -7.52* 0.000  -3.50 
LGDP(0) -2.47 0.33  ΔLGDP(0) -7.53* 0.000  -3.50 
Greece 1957-2013, Intercept 
Phillips Perron unit root test (pp) 
Variables PP P-Value  Variables PP P-Value  Critical value (5%) 
Lmil(0)*** -1.21 0.66  ΔLMil(4) -5.81* 0.0000  -2.91 
LGDP(4) -1.26 0.64  ΔLGDP(4) -4.89* 0.0002  -2.91 
Greece 1957-2013, Intercept and Trend 
Phillips Perron unit root test (pp) 
Variables PP P-Value  Variables PP P-Value  Critical value (5%) 
Lmil(0) -1.60 0.77  ΔLMil(5) -5.58* 0.0001  -3.5 




        
Turkey 1957-2013, Intercept 
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Phillips Perron unit root test (pp) 
 Variables PP P-Value  Variables PP P-Value  Critical value (5%) 
Lmil(1) -1.11 0.7040  ΔLMil(4) -7.80* 0.00  -2.91 
LGDP(2) -0.77 0.81  ΔLGDP(3) -7.63* 0.00  -2.91 
Turkey 1957-2013, Intercept and Trend 
Phillips Perron unit root test (pp) 
Variables PP P-Value  Variables PP P-Value  Critical value (5%) 
Lmil(0) -2.65 0.26  ΔLMil(5) -7.74* 0.000  -3.50 
LGDP(1) -2.49 0.32  ΔLGDP(3) -7.57* 0.00  -3.50 
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. ** number in 
parentheses of ADF indicates the lag length based on SIC.***number in parentheses in PP indicates 
the Bandwidth,  Newey-West using Barlett kernel. 
 
4.2. Johansen approach 
We found evidence from ADF and PP test that all the series are integrated of 
first order (I (1)). For the case of Greece we have one three dimensional VAR 
(LMIL, LGDP, D1993) and estimated using two lag of the variables in order to 
obtain non-correlated residuals. We include one
3
 dummy variable (D1993) in order 
to account for specific structural breaks in Greek military spending during the 
tested period. In our estimated model the dummy is kept in the respective VAR as 
it turned out to be significant, whereas its absence will mean non normal residuals 
for the relevant VAR. For the case of Turkey, we have one two 
4
dimensional VAR 
(Lmil, LGDP). Finally, for the arms race hypothesis, we have one four dimensional 
VAR (LmilGR, LmilTRK, LGDPGR, LGDPTRK). 
All the VARs satisfy all the statistical assumptions required for the Johanshen 
approach and we can apply cointegration analysis. In Table 3 are reported the 
diagnostic tests for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in all the VARs. 
 
Table 3. Diagnostic tests 
Greece 1957-2013     
 
Heteroskedasticity F-critical Autocorrelation 
 
 
F(14,30)= 0.59 2,01 LM-STAT 
Critical (Chi-
sq)(df=4) 









    
 
Heteroskedasticity F-critical Autocorrelation 
 
 
F(14,32)= 0.66 2,01 LM-STAT 
Critical (Chi-
sq)(df=4) 









    
 
Heteroskedasticity F-critical Autocorrelation 
 
 
F(16,25)= 1.77 2,07 LM-STAT 
Critical (Chi-
sq)(df=16) 










3 We applied unit root tests with breaks we found more than one structural changes, however when 
we include them in the VAR, the residuals were correlated and we could not reject the hypothesis of 
the presence of heteroskedasticity. Thus, we include only the break at 1993, where all the diagnostic 
tests satisfy all the statistical assumptions. 
4 We applied the dates obtained from Chow test as dummies, however we cannot reject the presence 
of heteroscedasticity. Thus, we do not include them in the VAR. 
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Johansen‟s cointegration approach uses the maximum likelihood estimation in a 
VAR model. There are two statistics created by this approach: the trace statistic 
and maximum Eigenvalue. The Trace statistic examine the null hypothesis that 
there is at most r number of cointegrating vectors and the alternative hypothesis of 
r or more than r number of cointegrating vectors. The maximum Eigenvalue 
statistics examine for r number of cointegrating vectors against the alternative of r 
+ 1 number of cointegrating vectors. The results of Johansen approach for our 
models are reported in Table 4 and indicate that there is one cointegration vector 
between military spending and GDP during 1957-2010 in Greece and in arms race 
hypothesis (Greece-Turkey). This happens because we reject the null hypothesis 
that r=0, so we have at least one cointegration vector.  Finally, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration in the case of Turkey. 
 
Table 4. Johansen Cointegration test 
Greece 1957-2013                 
VAR 1: (Lmil GR, LGDPGR, DUM1993), 2 lags   
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized   Trace 0.05   Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** No. of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
r=0  0.466457  44.81772*  29.79707  0.0005 r=0  0.466457  32.66725*  21.13162  0.0008 
r=1  0.164146  12.15047  15.49471  0.1499 r=1  0.164146  9.323654  14.26460  0.2602 
r=2  0.052911  2.826815  3.841466  0.0927 r=2  0.052911  2.826815  3.841466  0.0927 
Turkey 1957-2013                 
VAR 2: (LmilTRK, LGDPTRK), 1 lag   
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized   Trace 0.05   Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** No. of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
r=0  0.170801  10.00156  15.49471  0.2806 r=0  0.170801  9.739376  14.26460  0.2296 
r=1 
 0.005029  0.262181  3.841466  0.6086 
r=1 
 0.005029  0.262181  3.841466  0.6086 
Greece-Turkey  1957-2013                 
VAR 3: (LmilGR, LmilTRK, LGDPGR, LGDPTRK), 1 
lag 
  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized   Trace 0.05   Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** No. of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
r=0  0.382778  47.54765*  40.17493  0.0077 r=0  0.382778  25.64381*  24.15921  0.0586 
r=1  0.236221  23.90384  24.27596  0.0556 r=1  0.236221  13.20435  17.79730  0.2150 
r=2  0.194988  10.69948  12.32090  0.0921 r=2  0.194988  10.62801  11.22480  0.0635 
         r=3  0.001458  0.071475  4.129906  0.8264 r=3  0.001458  0.071475  4.129906  0.8264 
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
 
4.3. Engle-Granger cointegration technique 
One other simple method of cointegration is Engle-Gragner (EG) or Augmented 
Engle-Gragner (AEG) test (1987). This approach is based in the idea that if there is 
a cointegration between the variables, the residuals that will be obtained from OLS 
equations, has to be stationary. So, in order to test for long run relationship 
between military spending and GDP, we are testing the stationarity of residuals 
with the help of ADF. 
 
Table 5.  Engle-Granger technique (1
st
 step) 
Greece 1957-2013       




0.01319 LMil -4.063083 -3.58351 1.133 
C 2.472420 7.69490 0.32130 C 29.61676 19.3002 1.534 
        
N 56   N 56   
R-squared 0.912   R-squared 0,92   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.177   Adjusted 
R-squared 
0,177   
Durbin-Watson 0.229   Durbin-
Watson 
0,04   
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F-stat 12.84   F-stat 12.84   
Turkey 1957-2013       




0.00382 LMil -18.04379 -7.99553 2.256 
C 2.292163 19.2659 0.11897 C 54.98644 17.5053 3.141 
        N 54   N 54   
R-squared 0.55   R-squared 0.55   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.54   Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.54   
Durbin-Watson 0.46   Durbin-
Watson 
0.36   
F-stat 63.92   F-stat 6392   
Greece-Turkey 1957-2013      
LmilGR Coefficient t-stat Std.Error LmilTRK Coefficient t-stat Std.Err
or 
LmilTRK 0.643492 6.3389 0.1015 LmilGR 0.684822 6.3389 0.108 
C 0.444709 3.1523 0.1410 C 0.456715 3.1354 0.145 
        
N 53   N 53   
R-squared 0.44   R-squared 0.44   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.42   Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.42   
Durbin-Watson 0.39   Durbin-
Watson 
0.37   
F-stat 40.18   F-stat 40.19   
 
 
We are testing if the residuals𝑒𝑡 = −𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑡 − 𝑐 − 𝑏𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡    have a unit root, by 
performing a unit root test.  The results reported in Table 6 indicate that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that there is unit root in 5% critical value for the tested 
period. Since the computed t value for the first period is much higher than the 
critical value, our conclusion is that the residuals from the equations, 𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 −
𝑏𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝑐 − 𝑏𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡  are stationary. According to Gujarati (2003), 
hence the equations:  𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 − 𝑏𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡  and   𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝑐 − 𝑏𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡  are 
cointegrating regressions and the regression is not spurious. Hence, we can reject 
the null hypothesis for the tested period, so 𝜀𝑡  is stationary and there is evidence of 
long run relationship between military spending and GDP or between the military 
spending of the two countries. 
 
Table 6. Unit root tests in residuals (Engle-Granger 2
nd
 step) 
Greece 1957-2013     
LGDP     LMil   
t-statistic -5.32* 
(0.0000) 
  t-statistic -5.47* 
(0.0000) 
t-critical -2,92  t-critical -2,92 
Conclusion Stationary   Conclusion Stationary 
Turkey 1957-2013     
LGDP     LMil   
t-statistic -6.86*   t-statistic -7.11* 
(0.000) (0.000) 
t-critical -2.92  t-critical -2.92 
Conclusion Stationary   Conclusion Stationary 
Greece-Turkey     
LMilGR     LMilTRK   
t-statistic -7.065*   t-statistic -8.12* 
(0.000) (0.000) 
t-critical -2.93  t-critical -2.93 
Conclusion Stationary   Conclusion Stationary 
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Furthermore, the calculated elasticities from OLS support the view of the 
economist and politicians that military spending has a negative impact on 
economic growth of these two countries. Government authorities and politicians 
should decrease the military spending in order to boost the economic growth in 
their countries. 
 
4.4. Granger Causality tests 
If two variables are cointegrated, we can use the Granger causality test (1969) in 
order to check the short run relationship between variables. The Granger causality 
test examine whether variable Y‟s current value can be explained by its own past 
value and whether the explanatory power could be improved by adding the past 
value of another variable X. If the coefficient of X is statistically significant, X is 
said to Granger cause Y. 
We run the Granger causality test by using two lags in order to ensure 
uncorrelated residuals. The Johansen cointegration approach results indicate that 
there is one cointegration vector between military spending and economic growth, 
so we can define the Granger causality tests as joint test (F-tests) for the 
significance of the lagged value of the assumed exogenous variable and for the 
significance of the error correction term.  The results are reported in Table 7 and 
indicate that Granger causality is running from military spending to GDP in Greece 
and Turkey. Finally, there is no evidence of causality between the Greek and 
Turkish military spending, so we reject the hypothesis of arms race between the 
two countries. 
 
Table 7. Granger causality test 
Greece 1957-2013 F-stat P-value   F-stat P-value 
LGDP causes LMil 3.14 0.052 LMil causes LGDP 5.99* 0.0048 
Turkey 1957-2013 F-stat P-value   F-stat P-value 
LGDP causes LMil 1.33 0.27 LMil causes LGDP 3.25* 0.047 
Greece -Turkey 1957-2013 F-stat P-value   F-stat P-value 
LMilTRK causes LMilGR 1.04 0.35 LMilGR causes LMilTRK 2.98 0.06 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we empirically test the relationship between military spending and 
economic growth for Greece and Turkey during 1957-2013, and examine the 
validity of arms race hypothesis between the two countries. We deployed unit root 
tests, unit root tests with structural changes, cointegration techniques and finally 
Granger causality tests. Greece is a very interesting case in European Union for 
examining the relationship between military spending and economic growth. 
Greece is a small, industrialised country, with many economic problems such as 
huge deficits, an exploding public debt and security concerns such as problems 
mainly with Turkey. 
Our empirical results of both cointegration techniques applied in the case of 
Greece indicate the existence of long-run relationship between the military 
spending and economic growth. In the case of Turkey, the Johansen technique 
shows that there is no long-run relationship between military spending and 
economic growth. This is in accordance to Dunne et al.  (2001), who found long 
run relationship between military spending and growth in Greece but not in 
Turkey. The Engle-Granger technique estimations indicate that there is a negative 
impact of military spending in economic growth in both countries which support 
the view of most economists and politicians in both countries (Antonakis & 
Karavidas, 1990; Antonakis, 1997; Andreou, Parsopoulis & Vrahatis, 2002; 
Kollias, 2004). Especially in Greece, the large military spending during the last 
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decades had a negative impact on the economic growth of the country. Dunne & 
Nikolaidou (2001) found that military spending has a positive impact in Greece and 
negative in Turkey.  
Granger causality tests in the case of Greece and Turkey imply that the causality 
runs from military spending to economic growth. Thus, if these countries want to 
improve their economic performance and reduce the budget deficits, they have to 
reduce the huge military burden. When we examine the long run relationship 
between the Greek and Turkish military spending, we find that these variables are 
cointegrated, and when we apply the Granger causality tests we find that there is no 
evidence of causality between Greek and Turkish military spending, which mean 
that that these countries act independently. Our findings are in accordance with 
previous studies of Majeski (1981), Kollias (2002), and Ocal (2009), that there is 
no support of the arms race hypothesis between Greece and Turkey. 
However, the rejection of arms race hypothesis was not predictable, since after 
the period of Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 and the bilateral arguments which 
was and is still regarded as the main reason for the Greek–Turkish increase of 
military spending during the last years. Finally, the empirical results indicate that 
for Greece and Turkey the causality runs from military spending to economic 
growth and that there is a negative impact of military spending to economic 
growth. Thus, if Greece and Turkey want to improve their economic performance 
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